Privatizing or restructuring state-owned enterprises may lead to mass layoffs, but the number of redundant workers is usually unknown beforehand. This paper estimates labor redundancy by comparing employment levels across enterprises with different degrees of state ownership. State-owned enterprises are modeled as a hybrid between labor-managed enterprises and profitmaximizing enterprises, with the profit motive becoming less prominent as the state share of capital increases. This model leads to an employment equation that is estimated using an enterprise database from Vietnam. The database, constructed especially for this paper, includes roughly one third of fully state-owned enterprises, one third of fully private enterprises, and one third of joint ventures between the state and the private sector. The employment equations control for sector of activity, region and age of the enterprise, among other variables. Based on the results, if the state share of capital was brought down to zero roughly half of the workers in the corresponding enterprises would be redundant. This is more than ten times the estimate by the current directors of the enterprises. The results also show a wide dispersion of redundancy across sectors of activity. Finally, the paper analyzes the correlation between the estimated labor redundancy and twelve ad hoc indicators of profitability, productivity and labor cost. It shows that the correlation is weak. But the correlation between most ad hoc indicators is weak too, which suggests that they are not a reliable tool to identify the most over-staffed enterprises.
Introduction
The prospect of mass layoffs is one of the main reasons for concern when privatizing or restructuring the state sector. However, reliable estimates of the number of workers who could lose their jobs as a result of privatization or restructuring are usually unavailable beforehand.
Only when a few enterprises are affected is a careful assessment of labor redundancy possible.
Then, engineers, sector experts, consulting firms or potential buyers can be requested to diagnose the enterprises, one by one, and estimate their excess labor. But this case-by-case approach is clearly unfeasible when hundreds, or even thousands, of state-owned enterprises are at stake, as it often happens in transition economies or in countries that relied on a state-led development strategy over long periods of time. These are typically the countries that need the restructuring of their public sectors the most. Uncertainty regarding the employment implications of privatization or restructuring may in turn be a powerful deterrent for action.
In the absence of better information, several approaches have been tried. One of them is to review the employment effects of privatization and restructuring in other countries (see Kikeri, 1997; Frydman et al., 1999; and Jefferson and Singh, 1999, among others) . While this approach has produced a wealth of information, one of its main conclusions is that the effects vary dramatically across experiences, from mass layoffs to substantial expansions in employment.
Deciding which of those experiences is more relevant for a particular country and period might be difficult. Another approach is to ask the directors of state-owned enterprises to report the fraction of their workers who are redundant. But their answers may not be revealing either.
These directors are more often bureaucrats than managers, and they do not face the right set of incentives to make personnel decisions anyway (World Bank, 1997) . Finally, a third approach is to infer the extent of labor redundancy from ad hoc indicators of profitability, productivity or labor costs. However, these ad hoc indicators might not be very telling. For instance, assessing the actual ratio of profits to capital in a state-owned enterprise is potentially difficult, as substantial government transfers might be hidden under a variety of forms. Given the weaknesses of the usual approaches to estimate the extent of labor redundancy, it is not surprising that downsizing efforts in preparation for privatization have had low or negligible payoffs (La Porta and López-de-Silanes, 1999 ).
This paper proposes a simple approach to estimate labor redundancy, based on a comparison of employment levels across enterprises with different degrees of state ownership.
The analytical framework is provided by the theory of labor-managed enterprises (for a survey, see Bonin, Jones and Putterman, 1993) . While privately owned enterprises maximize profits, labor-managed enterprises cater to the objectives of their workers, and these objectives usually involve some combination of employment and earnings. One possibility would be to model state-owned enterprises as if they actually were labor-managed enterprises (see, for instance, Dinopoulos and Lane, 1998) . But they can better be seen as a hybrid between labor-managed enterprises and profit-maximizing enterprises, with the profit-maximization objective being more prominent when the state share of capital is small, and the workers' objectives being more prominent when it is large. Such is the approach adopted in this paper.
The proposed analytical framework does not assume that state-owned enterprises are always over-staffed. Whether a reduction in the state share of capital leads to higher or lower employment is an open question, which can only be answered empirically. The theoretical ambiguity results from the fact that different groups of workers may attach different weights to the employment and earnings objectives. If the earnings objective is prominent, a labormanaged enterprise can be under-staffed. This ambiguity is consistent with the substantial variation in over-staffing revealed by country-specific studies. For instance, it has been claimed that the hardening of the budget constraint faced by Italian state-owned enterprises, which forced them to focus more on profit maximization, led to a reduction in their employment (Bertero and Rondi, 2000) . But in Brazil state-owned enterprises are allegedly more capital-intensive, and thus generate fewer jobs per unit of output, than privately owned enterprises (Clements, 1992) .
In fact, the proposed theoretical framework does not even imply that the effect of state ownership on employment is the same across all enterprises in a country. In this paper it is allowed to vary across sectors of activity.
At the empirical level, the paper estimates labor redundancy by regressing (the log of) employment at the enterprise-level on the share of the capital that is owned by the state, controlling for a variety of enterprise characteristics, such as age, sector of activity and region.
The last two control variables are intended to capture the different competitive pressures faced by individual enterprises. In this respect, the economic environment may be as important as state ownership to explain employment levels (see Bartel and Harrison, 2000) . Other things equal, employment should be higher in activities that are protected by trade barriers, or enjoy a softbudget constraint. Unfortunately, reliable indicators of the extent of product market competition, or of access to credit, are unavailable in many countries. In the absence of those indicators, the controls for sector of activity and region can be seen as proxies for the economic environment in which different groups of enterprises operate.
The specification used in the empirical analysis is directly derived from the theoretical framework described in previous paragraphs. The obtained coefficients allow predicting the change in enterprise-level employment if the share of capital owned by the state was set equal to zero, or brought down to some specified level. The labor redundancy indicator used in this paper is this predicted change, or zero when an expansion in employment is expected. This indicator might not be highly reliable at the enterprise level. But it should become more precise as the estimated difference is aggregated over all the enterprises in a sector of activity, or in the entire economy. The aggregated differences provide information on the number of workers who could lose their jobs if state-owned enterprises were to become (or to operate in the same way as) privately owned enterprises.
The proposed approach is applied to the enterprise sector of Vietnam. In this country, 5,740 state-owned enterprises employing 1.7 million workers will be either privatized or restructured over the next five years. While the personnel of these enterprises only accounts for five percent of the total labor force, it amounts to 15 percent of non-agricultural employment.
Moreover, workers in state-owned enterprises are part of the labor elite, and represent one of the most important political constituencies of the Vietnamese government. Many of these workers got their jobs as a reward for their sacrifices and courage during the American war. If a large fraction of them were to experience a dramatic decline in their wellbeing, pressures would mount to delay or even reverse the reform process. Assessing how many workers may lose their jobs as a result of privatization and restructuring is thus crucial to design an appropriate safety net, and to mobilize resources accordingly.
The data used in this paper are from a sample of 338 enterprises whose state share of capital ranges from zero to one hundred percent. One of the contributions of the paper is to have constructed such a database. Other developing countries have plant-level surveys covering large establishments in manufacturing, both state-owned and privately owned. But nothing similar exists in Vietnam. Even for state-owned enterprises, the available information refers mainly to financial indicators, such as revenue, costs or debt. The database used in this paper is made of detailed records from a variety of sources, including visits to several enterprises. The variables considered include employment, the state share of capital, and the percentage of workers who are redundant according to their current directors, among others. The list of enterprises in the database is determined by feasibility constraints, so that the sample is not randomly drawn. In particular, large enterprises are over-represented, and enterprises fully owned by the private sector are under-represented. However, the distribution of state-owned enterprises according to their institutional nature is similar in the sample and in the universe.
The results in the paper reveal substantial over-staffing in the state-owned enterprises of
Vietnam. If the state share of capital were brought down to zero in all of them, around half of their workers, if not more, would become redundant. This figure exceeds the labor redundancy estimate offered by the directors of those enterprises by one order of magnitude. Moreover, the paper shows that labor redundancy at the enterprise level is not correlated with the ad hoc indicators of profitability, productivity or labor cost which are traditionally used to assess the degree of over-staffing. It does not follow necessarily that the estimates in this paper are "better" than those based on ad hoc indicators. However, the latter are also weakly correlated between them, which suggests that ad hoc indicators provide an unreliable basis to assess the degree of labor redundancy.
State-Owned Enterprises in Vietnam
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Vietnam lost its main trading partner and about one billion rubles a year in aid. The result was a collapse in economic growth and high inflation, peaking at about 450 percent per year. Confronted with this situation, the government decided to follow China on the road to market socialism, also called market Leninism by reference to Lenin's New Economic Policy. In 1986, the 6 th National Congress of the Communist Party adopted the Doi Moi, or renovation process. Since then, several reform policies have been implemented, and Vietnam has been moving steadily from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy. According to Irvin (1996) , Vietnam's reform process went farther than China's over a shorter period of time.
The Doi Moi policies tried to improve the performance of state-owned enterprises by reducing subsidies and increasing competition in product markets. State-owned enterprises were also granted larger autonomy in their decision making, including the ability to adjust their product mix, to procure inputs, to introduce new technologies, to borrow, to acquire or lease assets, to hire and fire employees, and to allocate their after-tax profits. In addition, they were given the freedom to export their products, and to enter into joint ventures with foreign investors (World Bank, 1994 Responsibility for these benefits was transferred to the enterprises, to the extent allowed by their budget. The result was a widening of the dispersion in earnings and benefits across enterprises, sectors and regions. This dispersion was only partially restricted in 1997, when caps for individual earnings were set.
At present, the state sector of Vietnam is not large compared to most socialist economies, but it still plays a significant role in the economy. State-owned enterprises account for 5 percent of the labor force, but represent around a fifth of GDP. While their participation in agriculture is marginal, they generate almost a third of value added in manufacturing. About 40 percent of these enterprises consistently make profits, whereas 16 percent of them are permanent lossmakers. Profitable enterprises tend to be more labor-intensive, and more export-oriented, than unprofitable ones. It also appears that large enterprises perform better than small ones, and those owned by the central government perform better than those owned by local governments. About 90 percent of the largest 200 enterprises show positive pre-tax profits, but this may be partly due to their monopolistic position in product markets, and to their preferential treatment in credit and import markets.
When this paper was written, the government of Vietnam was initiating a new phase of its reform program. The National Enterprise Reform Committee had proposed a five-year plan, combining the liquidation of non-viable enterprises, the total or partial divestiture of hundreds of small and medium enterprises, and the restructuring of large enterprises bound to remain in state hands (see World Bank, 2000) . Over the first three years of this plan, 2,857 enterprises should be liquidated or divested. The restructuring of enterprises remaining in state hands should be achieved through restrictions on access to credit, diagnostic audits, and labor downsizing. In addition, all enterprises should be exposed to greater competition in product markets, as nontariff barriers should be gradually removed and tariff barriers lowered.
Theoretical Framework
The literature on labor-managed enterprises provides a useful conceptual framework to analyze the consequences of state ownership on employment. A labor-managed enterprise (LME) differs from a profit-maximizing enterprise (PME) in its objective function (see Svejnar, 1982, and Putterman, 1987) . While a PME caters to the interests of its shareholders, an LME serves the interests of its workers. These interests are likely to include job security and earnings above those offered by the market. In this paper, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) is seen as a hybrid between an LME and a PME, with its objective function reflecting a compromise between the interests of workers and those of shareholders. From this perspective, the optimization problem faced by an SOE is formally equivalent to the efficient bargaining problem analyzed by the literature on trade unions (see McDonald and Solow, 1981) .
In the simplest case, enterprise profits V can be defined as:
In this expression P is the output price, supposed constant, L is the labor input, F(.) is the production function, and T is a net transfer from the enterprise to the government. In an enterprise that is subsidized, or operates under a soft-budget constraint, T is negative.
A PME maximizes V with respect to L, taking the market wage as given. This yields the familiar first-order condition:
Equation (2) implies that workers are employed up to the point where the marginal product of labor, in value terms, is equal to the market wage. The resulting profit has to be non-negative. It can be expected to be strictly positive in the short term.
An LME may pay a salary E above the market wage. The resulting rent, E -W, is one of the arguments of the objective function U(.) of the LME. The other argument is job security or, more simply, the employment level:
The literature on labor-managed enterprises has devoted much attention to the case where maximizing the rent per worker is the only objective of the LME (Ward, 1958) , but this is an unnecessarily restrictive and unrealistic assumption. Regardless of the relative weight of the two arguments in function U(.), the LME has no interest in making a profit. Any additional revenue could be used to increase the salary of current workers, or to recruit new ones at the prevailing salary. The zero-profit condition implies:
Equation (4) means that in an LME all net revenue is divided equally among workers.
This simple theoretical framework is illustrated in Figure 1 . Profits are constant over all the points in each of the two hump-shaped curves in this figure. The slope of the constant-profit curves is obtained by totally differentiating equation (1), for a given level of V. The slope is positive (negative) when the productivity of the marginal worker is higher (lower) than his or her earnings. A PME prefers the lower curve to the higher one, because labor costs are smaller, for any employment level. However, the PME cannot pay less than the prevailing market wage. It therefore chooses point A, where equation (2) is verified. The dotted line connecting the points where the slope of the constant-profit curves is zero (A and B in the figure) is the neoclassical labor demand curve.
An LME, on the other hand, caters to the objectives of its workers. The utility of the workers is the same over all the points in the downward-sloping curve in Figure 1 . The slope of the constant-utility curve is obtained by totally differentiating equation (3), for a given level of U. The farther this curve is from the origin, the higher the utility of the workers. A necessary condition for the LME to maximize the utility of its workers is to make no profits. In the figure, it is assumed that profits are zero in the higher constant-profit curve. An LME therefore chooses the tangency point between the zero-profit curve and the constant-utility curve, represented by point C. Note that if the only objective of the workers were to maximize the rent per worker, the constant-utility curves would be horizontal and an LME would choose point B.
Although an LME caters to the interests of its workers, its employment level can be either higher or lower than that of an otherwise identical PME. To illustrate this point, consider the case where T = 0, and functions F(.) and U(.) verify:
Equation (5) is a particular case of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Equation (6) is a Stone-Geary utility function, with reservation levels represented by the market wage and the enterprise shutdown. Parameters α and β fall between zero and one.
Employment in a PME can be derived directly from equation (2), inserting the expression of F'(.) resulting from (5):
Employment in an LME is obtained maximizing equation (6), for T = 0, under the constraints represented by equations (4) and (5):
According to equations (7) and (8), the elasticity of employment to changes in the real producer wage is the same in an LME and in a PME. But the absolute level of employment can be different. If employment features prominently among the workers' objectives (i.e. if β < 0.5), the LME is over-staffed compared to the PME. The opposite holds true if maximizing the rent per worker is the most important objective. In Figure 1 , the employment level is the same in a PME and an LME (points A and C lie on the same vertical line), which corresponds to the case where β = 0.5.
The employment and pay decisions made by an SOE can be seen as the outcome of a negotiation between shareholders and workers. Using the Nash-bargaining solution, the objective function Z(.) of an SOE can be written as:
In equation (9), S represents the bargaining power of workers. From this perspective, an SOE resembles a profit maximizing enterprise negotiating an efficient contract with its trade union. A key assumption of this paper is that the bargaining power of workers increases with state ownership. In the simplest case, S can be measured by the state share of capital. When S = 0, there is fully private ownership, and the enterprise behaves as a PME. When S = 1, there is full control by the state, and the enterprise behaves as an LME. In terms of Figure 1 , the SOE equilibrium lies on a line connecting points A and C.
Employment in an SOE can be derived replacing equations (1), (4), (5) and (6) in equation (9). For T = 0, the first-order condition of this problem yields:
It follows from equation (10) that employment in an SOE falls in between employment in a PME and in an otherwise identical LME. These two polar cases obtain for S = 0 and S = 1 respectively. Quite intuitively, employment in an SOE increases with the state share of capital if β < 0.5, and decreases otherwise. State ownership can therefore be associated with either overstaffing or under-staffing, depending on whether workers attach more weight to the employment or the rent objective respectively.
The Enterprise Database
The relationship between state ownership and the level of employment is assessed in this General Corporation in the database, there are 19.5 of them in the universe. The ratio climbs to 31.9 for other state-owned enterprises. However, for each worker in a General Corporation in the database, there are 7.6 of them in the universe. The corresponding ratio for other stateowned enterprises is 8.9. Given this similarity of employment ratios, and given also the employment focus of this paper, the analysis is carried out as if the database was self-weighted, without applying expansion factors to blow it up.
Tables 2 and 3 report the averages of the main variables in the enterprise database, organized by sector of activity and institutional sector respectively. Sectors of activity are defined so as to be relatively homogeneous but include a minimum of three enterprises each.
Institutional sectors refer to the type of arrangement governing state ownership, from control by the central government, to control by local governments, to General Corporations. The figures in Tables 2 and 3 are non-weighted averages over all valid observations in each cell, with the number of valid observations depending on the variable considered. For the employment variable, a breakdown by type of labor contract is shown. This breakdown is potentially useful when dealing labor redundancy and its implications, because job termination procedures may vary depending on the nature of the contracts linking workers and enterprises. For instance, not renewing a contract is a termination option for temporary workers, but not for workers with permanent jobs.
Employment Equations
The simple theoretical model presented in section 3 links employment at the enterprise level (L) with a state ownership indicator (S) and the real producer wage (W/P). Whereas the enterprise database contains information on the former two variables, the latter is in most cases unobservable. Enterprises where some of the capital is owned by the state can be expected to pay salaries above the market wage. In terms of the model, the variable observed for these enterprises is E, not W. An alternative would be to infer the value of W from the average salary in fully private enterprises. But this alternative would lead to an endogeneity problem. Some fully private enterprises may pay higher or lower wages than others, and the reasons why they do so may also determine that they employ more or less workers than others. Under these circumstances, the coefficients of an employment equation containing L on its left-hand-side and the observed (or inferred) W in its right-hand-side would be biased.
The alternative chosen in this paper is to replace W/P by exogenous proxies of it (called X hereafter), such as dummy variables for sector of activity and region. The relevant nominal wage W is likely to increase with workers' skills, and the required skills are different across sectors of activity. Nominal wages also display substantial geographical variation; for instance, they tend to be higher in more urbanized areas. As regards the producer price P, it crucially depends on the degree of competition faced by enterprises. For example, other things equal, P should be higher in sectors of activity protected by high tariffs. The dummy variables for sector of activity and region thus summarize the economic environment in which enterprises operate.
This environment is shaped both by geography and by economic policy.
Other potentially useful proxies for the relevant real producer wage are the age of the enterprise, its export orientation, and its capital stock. Age, for instance, could be seen as an indication of the scale of the enterprise, as it takes time to build up the optimal production capacity. Other things equal, an old enterprise could be expected to be "bigger" than a new one, hence to have a higher employment level. Similarly, an export-oriented enterprise could in principle be more labor intensive than one producing for the domestic market only, as labor is the relatively abundant factor in Vietnam. Finally, an enterprise with a large capital stock could be expected to have more workers, as its labor productivity would be higher, other things equal.
Arguably, age, export orientation and capital stock are not exogenous. To address this criticism (and also due to data limitations) these other indicators are introduced in the empirical analysis one at a time.
A basic specification for the employment equation is the following:
This specification is directly derived from equation (10). The sub-index "i" refers to the enterprise (i = 1, 2, …, 338). The stochastic disturbance ε i captures the effect of other variables not considered in the model, and parameter λ 1 measures the impact of state ownership on (the log of) employment. Equation (11) implicitly assumes that this impact is linear over the relevant range of S, and also that it is the same across all enterprises. To our knowledge, a similar specification has only been used by Jones and Backus (1989) to assess the impact of profit sharing on employment in the UK. In the paper by Jones and Backus, S is replaced by a series of indicators of workers' involvement in their enterprises.
A more elaborate specification of the employment equation has to allow for a differential impact of state ownership in different sectors of activity. The degree of product market competition, or access to credit, should affect employment levels. But the size of this effect is not necessarily the same for state-owned and privately owned enterprises. It follows that the change in ownership may have different implications depending on the economic environment faced by different enterprises. A more general specification for the employment equation is:
In equation (12) 
Results
Tables 4 and 5 report estimates of equation (11). In Table 4 , S is measured through the state share of capital. In Table 5 , it is replaced by a set of dummy variables indicating whether the enterprise is fully owned by the state or is a joint venture, with fully private ownership serving as the default option. The columns in each table differ in the nature of the X variables considered. The most parsimonious specification, in column A, only has S as a right-hand-side variable. Not surprisingly, the fit of the equation is poor. But coefficient λ 1 is highly significant.
The value of this coefficient does not vary dramatically as other variables are included in the right-hand-side of the employment equation. Columns are ordered by decreasing number of observations. All the coefficients on the X variables have the expected signs, and almost all of them are significant (the exception is the coefficient on the export-orientation variable, which is not statistically different from zero).
Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the effect of state ownership on employment is significantly positive. In terms of the model presented above, these results correspond to the case where β < 0.5, which means that employment carries more weight than rent among the objectives of SOE workers. Moreover, the effect of state ownership is potentially large. For instance, in column A in Table 4 , the estimated value of coefficient λ 1 is 0.657. This implies that shifting from S = 0 to S =1 would lead to a 92.9 percent increase in employment Table 4 or   Table 5 are considered instead. However, these two tables implicitly assume that the effect is the same across all sectors of activity, and this is an excessively restrictive assumption. Tables 4 and   5 . For instance, column B controls for age, sector of activity and region in all three tables.
Unfortunately, estimates cannot be obtained for θ 1 + θ 4 in all cases, as information on some of the right-hand-side variables is missing (or displays no variation) for all enterprises in some specific sectors. For the available estimates, the results in Table 6 are quite consistent across specifications, and suggest a substantial dispersion in the effect of state ownership on employment across sectors. In particular, there appears to be no employment effect in enterprises producing food, beverages and tobacco; footwear, bags and leather; and plastic products. On the other hand, state ownership is associated with significantly higher employment levels in textile and garments; construction and infrastructure; machinery and equipment; iron and steel; coal and minerals; oil and gas; and transportation. It is associated with lower employment levels in enterprises producing paper products.
Labor Redundancy Estimates
The employment equations estimated in the previous section indicate whether state ownership is associated with higher employment levels, but the analysis has to be taken one step further in order to assess the fraction of workers who are redundant. This fraction depends not only on the estimated effect of state ownership, but also on the share of the capital owned by the state in each enterprise. A large effect of state ownership on employment does not imply that over-staffing is substantial if the state share of capital is small. More generally, the assessment of over-staffing cannot be done without taking into account the distribution of the state ownership variable across enterprises. Labor redundancy at the enterprise level is measured in this paper as the (downward) change in predicted employment if the state share of capital was brought to zero. If the resulting change in predicted employment is positive, the paper assumes that the enterprise has no redundant workers. In analytical terms the labor redundancy indicator r i is defined as:
when the specification in equation (11) is used, and as:
when equation (12) is used instead. The hats over the parameters indicate that these are estimated values. By construction, labor redundancy is measured as a percentage of current employment. Figure 2 shows the kernel density of the labor redundancy indicator across all the enterprises in the sample that have some degree of state ownership. The horizontal axis in all five panels ranges from 0 to 100 percent. The four panels in the bottom part of the figure are constructed using equation (14), with the estimated values of θ 1 + θ 4 taken from columns B to E in Table 6 . The underlying number of observations is smaller in the third panel (based on regression in Table 6C ) and especially in the fourth panel (based on regression in Table 6D ), as no estimated values of θ 1 + θ 4 are available for some sectors of activity. However, all four panels show a roughly bi-modal distribution of labor redundancy with a first mode clearly below 25 percent, and a second a much bigger mode at around 75 percent of current employment. The first mode is somewhat blurred in the fourth panel, but this may be due to the fact that this panel is based on fewer observations. For comparison purposes, the panel in the top part of Figure 2 displays the kernel density of the labor redundancies reported by current directors. In this panel, only the first mode is visible.
The labor redundancy indicator can be aggregated over all enterprises with some degree of state ownership in a specific sector of activity, or in the entire economy. Assume there are N a enterprises in sector "a". The actual employment level of these enterprises can be used to weight the labor redundancy indicator, as follows:
The aggregate The estimated values of r a across all sectors of activity and in the entire economy are reported in Table 7 . The last four columns in this table are based on the same r i indicators used to draw Figure 2 . The second data column is based on the r i indicator that can be constructed using equation (13), with the estimated value of taken from column A in Table 4 . For comparison purposes, the first data column of the table also reports the average labor redundancy as estimated by the current directors of the enterprises. For the entire economy, the approach used in this paper yields an average labor redundancy around 50 percent, or slightly higher. The figure varies depending on whether the effect of state ownership is assumed to be the same for all enterprises (as in the second data column) or to differ across sectors of activity (as in the last four columns). But all the figures fall within a relatively narrow range. And they are all more than ten times larger than the average labor redundancy estimated by current directors.
The estimated labor redundancy varies considerably across sectors. Only when the regression in column A of Table 4 is used to calculate r i is the variance small, but this is because the effect of state ownership is assumed to be the same across the board. When the regressions in columns B to E in Table 6 are used instead, state-owned enterprises appear to be "lean" in some sectors, but heavily over-staffed in others. Labor redundancy is not a serious concern in food, beverages and tobacco; in paper products; and in footwear, bags and leather. At the other end, labor redundancy is dramatic in transportation; oil and gas; construction and infrastructure;
iron and steel; coal and minerals; and machinery and equipment. Other sectors of activity fall in between these two extremes, or display conflicting labor redundancy estimates depending on the regression used to calculate r i .
Other Redundancy Indicators
The analysis in the previous section shows that the current directors of state-owned enterprises substantially under-estimate the extent of labor redundancy. But it could be argued that their assessment still provides valuable information. Such would be the case if this assessment were correlated with the "true" extent of labor redundancy. For instance, one could imagine a situation where the "true" labor redundancy could be estimated by multiplying the labor redundancy reported by current directors by a factor of 10, or 15. Similarly, the ad hoc indicators of profitability, productivity or labor cost that are often used to identify over-staffed enterprises could be correlated with the "true" extent of labor redundancy. While the latter is not observable, it is at least possible to analyze the correlation between these other indicators of labor redundancy and those generated in this paper. Table 8 considers three sets of ad hoc indicators of labor redundancy at the enterprise level, in addition to the figures reported by current directors and to the estimates generated by this paper. One set of ad hoc indicators is based on profitability, as measured by the ratio of gross profits to the value of production, the capital stock, value added, or the number of workers.
A higher profitability should be associated with lower labor redundancy. The second set of indicators reflects the productivity of the enterprise, measured in a variety of ways, from value of production per worker to exports per worker. A higher productivity should also be associated with lower labor redundancy. Finally, the third set focuses on the labor characteristics of the enterprise; it includes the average labor cost and three measures of the difficulty to layoff workers. These indicators should be positively correlated with labor redundancy.
However, all these ad hoc indicators are weakly correlated, if at all, with the extent of labor redundancy estimated in this paper. The only strong correlations in Table 8 are between the labor redundancy indicators constructed based on the regressions in columns B to E of Table   6 . All other coefficients are close to zero. Although they tend to have the expected signs, almost all of them are statistically insignificant. Only gross profits per worker and the value of production per worker display a significant negative correlation with some (but not all) of the labor redundancy indicators estimated in this paper. The percentage of redundant workers reported by current directors is also weakly correlated with all the other indicators, with only two exceptions. These are the ad hoc indicators for the average labor cost and the fraction of workers on permanent and long-term contracts. But the sign of these two correlation coefficients is opposite to what could be expected.
Taken together, the kernel densities in Figure 2 and the correlation coefficients in Table 8 suggest that current directors are willing to recognize over-staffing in viable enterprises, but deny it in heavily bloated or non-viable enterprises. The kernel densities in Figure 2 showed a roughly bi-modal distribution of labor redundancy, but only the first mode (clearly below 25 percent) was acknowledged by current directors. Admitting the extent of labor redundancy revealed by the second mode (at around 75 percent) would probably amount to pleading guilty of mismanagement. The correlation coefficients in Table 8 show that current directors report lower labor redundancy in enterprises where salaries are high and a large proportion of workers are on permanent or long-term contracts. Laying off workers who earn a substantial rent or enjoy a considerable degree of job security is undoubtedly difficult. Not acknowledging the problem could be a way to avoid conflict within the enterprise.
The weak correlation between the indicators of labor redundancy estimated in this paper and the ad hoc indicators does not imply that the former are better. However, the latter also display a weak correlation between them, which suggests that they are not reliable. In principle, all three sets of ad hoc indicators should tell the same story. More specifically, there should be a positive correlation between profitability and productivity indicators, and a negative correlation between them and the labor cost indicators. At a first glance, Table 9 suggests that this is indeed the case. However, many of the correlation coefficients in this table suffer from a potentially serious measurement-error bias. For instance, consider two indicators whose denominator is the number of workers in the enterprise. If this number is misreported for some enterprises, the estimated correlation coefficient will be positive even if the two indicators are actually uncorrelated. In Table 9 , all the correlation coefficients that suffer, by construction, from potential measurement-error bias are highlighted in italics. Only two of the correlation coefficients that are not highlighted in italics turn out to be significant. It follows that the list of severely over-staffed enterprises could differ considerably depending on the chosen ad hoc indicator of labor redundancy.
Conclusions
Several approaches have been tried to predict the number of workers who could lose their jobs due to the privatization or restructuring of state-owned enterprises. In some cases, predictions are simply based on the international experience. In others, the current directors of state-owned enterprises are requested to report the number of redundant workers. The most common practice, however, is to infer the extent of labor redundancy from ad hoc indicators of profitability, productivity or labor cost. This paper casts doubts on the relevance of these three approaches, and proposes an alternative method, based on a systematic comparison of employment levels across enterprises that are similar in many respects, but differ in the share of the capital that is owned by the state.
The proposed method is illustrated using data from Vietnam, a country where thousands of state-owned enterprises are scheduled for privatization and restructuring over the next five years. The results show that the fraction of workers who would become redundant could exceed the fraction estimated by the current directors of these enterprises by one order of magnitude.
They also show that labor redundancy varies dramatically across sectors of activity, from negligible in some to overwhelming in others. Finally, the results show that the estimated labor redundancy is only weakly correlated with ad hoc indicators of profitability, productivity and labor cost. More worryingly, these ad hoc indicators are only weakly correlated between them.
However, it should not be inferred that roughly half of the workers in the state-owned enterprises of Vietnam are going to be laid off over the next five years. There are two important reasons why this estimate, done for illustration purposes, may differ from the actual number of layoffs. First, the reform process of Vietnam will lead to changes in the economic environment in which enterprises operate. Trade barriers will be lowered, entry by new enterprises will be facilitated, and access to soft-loans will be curtailed. Increased competition and a harder budget constraint could lead to labor redundancies in all state-owned enterprises, even if their state share of capital remained unchanged. From this perspective, the number of laid off workers could be higher than suggested by the estimate in this paper.
The second reason why the estimate in this paper may differ from the actual number of layoffs is related to the pace and depth of the privatization process. The estimate in this paper implicitly assumes that all state-owned enterprises will instantly become profit-maximizers. In practice, the state share of capital will remain considerable in many of them, and divestiture will only proceed gradually for the others. Over the next five years, these enterprises will be able to adjust gradually by not renewing some of the workers on temporary contracts, and by relying on natural attrition. In principle, at least, for any turnover rate a pace of privatization could be found such that no "hard" layoffs would be required. Without reaching such an extreme, the reform process of Vietnam is likely to differ from instant divestiture.
Applied work is currently being carried at the World Bank to predict the number of workers who could actually be laid off, hence to design an appropriate safety net. This work combines the redundancy estimates in this paper with the announced timetable for privatizing and restructuring state-owned enterprises. The announced timetable includes the number of enterprises to be liquidated and privatized each year, without identifying them (see World Bank, 29 2000) . In the applied work, it is assumed that the enterprises with the lowest profit-to-capital ratio are liquidated first, and the enterprises with the highest ratio are privatized first. It is also assumed that within each enterprise up to two thirds of the workers who are on short-term or temporary contracts can be replaced by workers who are on permanent or long-term contracts.
Under these assumptions, the reform program of Vietnam may require that some 400,000 workers be (voluntarily or involuntarily) separated from their jobs. This figure represents roughly one quarter of current employment in state-owned enterprises. Notes: The dependent variable is the log of employment. All regressions were estimated by ordinary least squares, with White-heteroskedasticity corrected errors. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Significant coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels are identified by one, two and three asterisks respectively. Notes: The dependent variable is the log of employment. All regressions were estimated by ordinary least squares, with White-heteroskedasticity corrected errors. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Significant coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels are identified by one, two and three asterisks respectively. Notes: The dependent variable is the log of employment. All regressions were estimated by ordinary least squares, with White-heteroskedasticity corrected errors. The table reports the sector-specific coefficients multiplying the share of state capital. Significant coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels are identified by one, two and three asterisks respectively. Note: Correlation coefficients are calculated at enterprise-level data, for all state-owned enterprises and joint ventures. Observations are excluded from the calculation due to missing values on a pair-by-pair basis. Significant correlation coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks respectively. Table 6B Based on regression in Table 6C Based on regression in Table 6D Based on regression in Table 6E Note: All graphs were constructed using the kernel density function of Stata, for 50 data points and a band width equal to 7 percentage points.
